Prussian Generals

(I gave a 10 minute presentation about the agile Prussian army at the last OpKoKo. It was well received, and I considered sharing the slides, but they don't say that much on their own. I converted it to a blog post with the gist of the presentation instead.)

What can agilistas learn from 19th century Prussian generals? Not much, it would seem. But bear with me, all will be revealed.

But let us start at the beginning. The year is 1800, and the Napoleonic wars are in full swing. Napoleon had a pleasant problem, with too many soldiers to command. Reform was necessary, and he came up with the concept of army corps (Corps d'Armée). A corps was a mini army with its own infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and a fairly independent commander. All in all about 20-30,000 men. The general staff was used to help control all corps in the army. A general staff in the modern sense was a product of the French revolution, and Napoleon benefited enormously from its invention.

French army size at Austerlitz and Wagram

As Napoleon demonstrated the superiority of his style of warfare, other nations started to copy his and France's ideas. Prussia was an early adopter of the French ideas, and it was Prussia who would carry the torch after the demise of Napoleon.

Carl von Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz served in the Prussian army, and later in the Russian army during the Napoleonic wars. Soon after the wars ended, in 1816, he started a work on the art of war. He never finished, instead dying from cholera in 1831. His widow published "Vom Kriege" ("On War") posthumously in 1832. Exactly how complete On War was has been hotly debated, but regardless it is considered to be the major treatise on the art and philosophy of war in the western world.

Some interesting points and concepts in On War are:

• Friction, things rarely go as planned when tiny problems accumulates. Roads are more difficult than envisioned, the weather is slowing movement, soldiers get drunk, and so on.
• Fog of war, commanders on all levels will have limited intelligence on which to act, and lack knowledge of the overall picture.
• War is the continuation of policy by other means. A phrase that has been misinterpreted as advocating war over politics, but what Clausewitz really means is that politicians must be the ones to decide if and when war is warranted, and what the goal of war is.

The first two points means that a commander must act and react swiftly on the information at hand. It is as necessary to adjust in the face of bad luck (or preparations), as it is to grasp opportunity when it presents itself.

The third point is important in that it means that war takes place in a context and, like it or not, politicians have a huge impact on how war is waged.

Helmuth von Moltke

Clausewitz found one of his most ardent supporters in Helmuth von Moltke. Moltke coined the phrase "No battle plan survives contact ?with the enemy", advocating adaptability at all levels.

Moltke became Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857, a position he held for the next 30 years. When his plans to defeat the Danes in the Second Schleswig War was bodged, he intervened and saved the day. Given this success, Moltke was influential enough to get his way in future wars. Prussia won major wars against Austria (1866), and France (1870-1871).

Though a great strategist, his key to success was meticulous preparations. (Moltke would probably consider that an important part of the strategy.)

• The Prussian war academy trained officers for staff service, and since the cadets were encouraged to socialize and befriend each other, a powerful social network was created within the Prussian army.
• Possible army movements was mapped out in detail. Thus commanders knew their logistical options instead of having to discover everything as they went.
  
• War games was used extensively to gain experience in maneuvering troops. (Moltke used blue figures for friendly troops and red for the enemy, colors that are still used today.)
• Commanders, on all levels, were encouraged to continuously assess the situation, and adjust their plans accordingly. To adjust was more important than to follow orders. One could in fact be reprimanded for following orders, if it meant that opportunities were missed.
  

The social network led to ad hoc collaboration on the battlefield. Intelligence and war game experience led to better, more informed decisions. Command culture led to exploiting enemy weaknesses and countering their strengths, dynamically, on the battle field.

During the second half of the 19th century, the Prussians were invincible.


Wait a Minute

Do you recognize :
1. Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
2. Working software over comprehensive documentation
3. Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
4. Responding to change over following a plan

Here is the complete manifesto

How does the Prussian army hold up against these ideals?

1. While the Prussians instituted processes and used the best tools available, they clearly favored individual decisions and collaboration. The deliberate fostering of informal social networks, and emphasis on responsibility and empowerment of individual officers is dead on.
2. Software was pretty uncommon at the time, but if we broaden software to include process and its documentation, I think it's fair to say that Prussia loved comprehensive documentation, but "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy". If process was broken, it was fixed on the spot.
3. I haven't touched on it, but Moltke collaborate with the political side, with good relations with Bismarck and the king, to ensure that the customer, Prussia, get the most from its army.
4. Moltkes war plans all fail, but the wars are won. Commanders on all levels reacts to and handles setbacks but, perhaps more importantly, grasp opportunities when they arise.

So, in my book the late 19th century army is the poster child of agile.

Conclusions

The Prussian example shows that agile thoughts are not new, and we can learn from their experience. In particular:

• Agile works in large projects
• Requires not only freedom in how follow orders, but even the right to break orders if they are deemed to be wrong (e.g. outdated or too costly)
• Skill and experience is required to navigate the fog and deal with friction along the way
• Local responsibilty requires authority and autonomy
• Communication is vital, and informal communication channels are as important as formal ones

References

• Militär ledning, Marco Smedberg (Swedish)
  
• Om kriget, Carl von Clausewitz (Swedish translation)
  
• The lazy project manager, Peter Taylor
• agilemanifesto.org
• www.clausewitz.com
• The role of leadership in software development - Mary Poppendieck (8:00 - 10:40)
• Wikipedia